Public Law 106-398

Appendix - H.R.5408

National Defense Authorization Act of 2001 - PDF

October 30, 2000

Division A
Title V
Subtitle D
Section 546 (a), page 119
(3) Numerous investigations following the attack on Pearl Harbor have documented that Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short were not provided necessary and critical intelligence that was available, that foretold of war with Japan, that warned of imminent attack, and that would have alerted them to prepare for attack…

(7) On June 15, 1944 an investigation conducted by Admiral T. C. Hart at the direction of the Secretary of the Navy produced evidence, subsequently confirmed, that essential intelligence concerning Japanese intentions and war plans was available in Washington but was not shared with Admiral Kimmel.

(8) (B) detailed information and intelligence about Japanese intentions and war plans were available in “abundance” but were not shared with the Lieutenant General Short’s Hawaii command;

(15) The Dorn Report found -
(A) that “Army and Navy officials in Washington were privy to intercepted Japanese diplomatic communications… which provided crucial confirmation of the imminence of war”;

(16) … the degree to which the commanders of the United States forces in Hawaii were not alerted about the impending attack on Hawaii was directly attributable to the withholding of intelligence from Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short.






PUBLIC LAW 106–398—APPENDIX 114 STAT. 1654A–119

McVay’s military record should now reflect that he is exonerated

for the loss of the U.S.S. Indianapolis and so many of

her crew.

(c) UNIT CITATION FOR FINAL CREW OF U.S.S. INDIANAPOLIS.—

The Secretary of the Navy should award a Navy Unit Commendation

to the U.S.S. Indianapolis (CA–35) and her final crew.

SEC. 546. POSTHUMOUS ADVANCEMENT ON RETIRED LIST OF REAR

ADMIRAL HUSBAND E. KIMMEL AND MAJOR GENERAL

WALTER C. SHORT, SENIOR OFFICERS IN COMMAND IN

HAWAII ON DECEMBER 7, 1941.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The late Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, while serving

in the temporary grade of admiral, was the Commander

in Chief of the United States Fleet and the Commander in

Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, at the time of the Japanese

attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941, with

an excellent and unassailable record throughout his career

in the United States Navy before that date.

(2) The late Major General Walter C. Short, while serving

in the temporary grade of lieutenant general, was the Commander

of the United States Army Hawaiian Department, at

the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii,

on December 7, 1941, with an excellent and unassailable record

throughout his career in the United States Army before that

date.

(3) Numerous investigations following the attack on Pearl

Harbor have documented that Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant

General Short were not provided necessary and critical intelligence

that was available, that foretold of war with Japan,

that warned of imminent attack, and that would have alerted

them to prepare for the attack, including such essential communiques

as the Japanese Pearl Harbor Bomb Plot message of

September 24, 1941, and the message sent from the Imperial

Japanese Foreign Ministry to the Japanese Ambassador in

the United States from December 6 to 7, 1941, known as

the Fourteen-Part Message.

(4) On December 16, 1941, Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant

General Short were relieved of their commands and returned

to their permanent grades of rear admiral and major general,

respectively.

(5) Admiral William Harrison Standley, who served as

a member of the investigating commission known as the Roberts

Commission that accused Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General

Short of ‘‘dereliction of duty’’ only six weeks after the

attack on Pearl Harbor, later disavowed the report, maintaining

that ‘‘these two officers were martyred’’ and ‘‘if they had been

brought to trial, both would have been cleared of the charge’’.

(6) On October 19, 1944, a Naval Court of Inquiry—

(A) exonerated Admiral Kimmel on the grounds that

his military decisions and the disposition of his forces at

the time of the December 7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor

were proper ‘‘by virtue of the information that Admiral

Kimmel had at hand which indicated neither the probability

nor the imminence of an air attack on Pearl Harbor’’;

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114 STAT. 1654A–120 PUBLIC LAW 106–398—APPENDIX

(B) criticized the higher command for not sharing with

Admiral Kimmel ‘‘during the very critical period of November

26 to December 7, 1941, important information . . .

regarding the Japanese situation’’; and

(C) concluded that the Japanese attack and its outcome

was attributable to no serious fault on the part of anyone

in the naval service.

(7) On June 15, 1944, an investigation conducted by

Admiral T. C. Hart at the direction of the Secretary of the

Navy produced evidence, subsequently confirmed, that essential

intelligence concerning Japanese intentions and war plans was

available in Washington but was not shared with Admiral

Kimmel.

(8) On October 20, 1944, the Army Pearl Harbor Board

of Investigation determined that—

(A) Lieutenant General Short had not been kept ‘‘fully

advised of the growing tenseness of the Japanese situation

which indicated an increasing necessity for better preparation

for war’’;

(B) detailed information and intelligence about Japanese

intentions and war plans were available in ‘‘abundance’’

but were not shared with the Lieutenant General

Short’s Hawaii command; and

(C) Lieutenant General Short was not provided ‘‘on

the evening of December 6th and the early morning of

December 7th, the critical information indicating an almost

immediate break with Japan, though there was ample time

to have accomplished this’’.

(9) The reports by both the Naval Court of Inquiry and

the Army Pearl Harbor Board of Investigation were kept secret,

and Rear Admiral Kimmel and Major General Short were

denied their requests to defend themselves through trial by

court-martial.

(10) The joint committee of Congress that was established

to investigate the conduct of Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant

General Short completed, on May 31, 1946, a 1,075-page report

which included the conclusions of the committee that the two

officers had not been guilty of dereliction of duty.

(11) On April 27, 1954, the Chief of Naval Personnel,

Admiral J. L. Holloway, Jr., recommended that Rear Admiral

Kimmel be advanced in rank in accordance with the provisions

of the Officer Personnel Act of 1947.

(12) On November 13, 1991, a majority of the members

of the Board for the Correction of Military Records of the

Department of the Army found that Major General Short ‘‘was

unjustly held responsible for the Pearl Harbor disaster’’ and

that ‘‘it would be equitable and just’’ to advance him to the

rank of lieutenant general on the retired list.

(13) In October 1994, the Chief of Naval Operations,

Admiral Carlisle Trost, withdrew his 1988 recommendation

against the advancement of Rear Admiral Kimmel and recommended

that his case be reopened.

(14) Although the Dorn Report, a report on the results

of a Department of Defense study that was issued on December

15, 1995, did not provide support for an advancement of Rear

Admiral Kimmel or Major General Short in grade, it did set

forth as a conclusion of the study that ‘‘responsibility for the

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PUBLIC LAW 106–398—APPENDIX 114 STAT. 1654A–121

Pearl Harbor disaster should not fall solely on the shoulders

of Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short, it should

be broadly shared’’.

(15) The Dorn Report found—

(A) that ‘‘Army and Navy officials in Washington were

privy to intercepted Japanese diplomatic communications

. . . which provided crucial confirmation of the imminence

of war’’;

(B) that ‘‘the evidence of the handling of these messages

in Washington reveals some ineptitude, some

unwarranted assumptions and misestimations, limited

coordination, ambiguous language, and lack of clarification

and followup at higher levels’’; and

(C) that ‘‘together, these characteristics resulted in

failure . . . to appreciate fully and to convey to the

commanders in Hawaii the sense of focus and urgency

that these intercepts should have engendered’’.

(16) On July 21, 1997, Vice Admiral David C. Richardson

(United States Navy, retired) responded to the Dorn Report

with his own study which confirmed findings of the Naval

Court of Inquiry and the Army Pearl Harbor Board of Investigation

and established, among other facts, that the war effort

in 1941 was undermined by a restrictive intelligence distribution

policy, and the degree to which the commanders of the

United States forces in Hawaii were not alerted about the

impending attack on Hawaii was directly attributable to the

withholding of intelligence from Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant

General Short.

(17) The Officer Personnel Act of 1947, in establishing

a promotion system for the Navy and the Army, provided

a legal basis for the President to honor any officer of the

Armed Forces of the United States who served his country

as a senior commander during World War II with a placement

of that officer, with the advice and consent of the Senate,

on the retired list with the highest grade held while on the

active duty list.

(18) Rear Admiral Kimmel and Major General Short are

the only two officers eligible for advancement under the Officer

Personnel Act of 1947 as senior World War II commanders

who were excluded from the list of retired officers presented

for advancement on the retired lists to their highest wartime

grades under that Act.

(19) This singular exclusion of those two officers from

advancement on the retired list serves only to perpetuate the

myth that the senior commanders in Hawaii were derelict

in their duty and responsible for the success of the attack

on Pearl Harbor, a distinct and unacceptable expression of

dishonor toward two of the finest officers who have served

in the Armed Forces of the United States.

(20) Major General Walter Short died on September 23,

1949, and Rear Admiral Husband Kimmel died on May 14,

1968, without the honor of having been returned to their wartime

grades as were their fellow commanders of World War

II.

(21) The Veterans of Foreign Wars, the Pearl Harbor Survivors

Association, the Admiral Nimitz Foundation, the Naval

Academy Alumni Association, the Retired Officers Association,

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114 STAT. 1654A–122 PUBLIC LAW 106–398—APPENDIX

and the Pearl Harbor Commemorative Committee, and other

associations and numerous retired military officers have called

for the rehabilitation of the reputations and honor of Admiral

Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short through their posthumous

advancement on the retired lists to their highest wartime

grades.

(b) ADVANCEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL KIMMEL AND MAJOR GENERAL

SHORT ON RETIRED LISTS.—(1) The President is requested—

(A) to advance the late Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel,

United States Navy (retired), to the grade of admiral on the

retired list of the Navy; and

(B) to advance the late Major General Walter C. Short,

United States Army (retired), to the grade of lieutenant general

on the retired list of the Army.

(2) Any advancement in grade on a retired list requested under

paragraph (1) shall not increase or change the compensation or

benefits from the United States to which any person is now or

may in the future be entitled based upon the military service

of the officer advanced.

(c) SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE PROFESSIONAL

PERFORMANCE OF ADMIRAL KIMMEL AND LIEUTENANT GENERAL

SHORT.—It is the sense of Congress—

(1) that the late Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel performed

his duties as Commander in Chief, United States Pacific

Fleet, competently and professionally and, therefore, that the

losses incurred by the United States in the attacks on the

naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, and other targets on

the island of Oahu, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941, were not

a result of dereliction in the performance of those duties by

then Admiral Kimmel; and

(2) that the late Major General Walter C. Short performed

his duties as Commanding General, Hawaiian Department,

competently and professionally and, therefore, that the losses

incurred by the United States in the attacks on Hickam Army

Air Field and Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, and other targets

on the island of Oahu, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941, were

not a result of dereliction in the performance of those duties

by then Lieutenant General Short.

SEC. 547. COMMENDATION OF CITIZENS OF REMY, FRANCE, FOR

WORLD WAR II ACTIONS.

(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress finds the following:

(1) On August 2, 1944, a squadron of P–51s from the

United States 364th Fighter Group strafed a German munitions

train in Remy, France.

(2) The resulting explosion killed Lieutenant Houston

Braly, one of the attacking pilots, and destroyed much of the

village of Remy, including seven stained glass windows in the

13th century church.

(3) Despite threats of reprisals from the occupying German

authorities, the citizens of Remy recovered Lieutenant Braly’s

body from the wreckage, buried his body with dignity and

honor in the church’s cemetery, and decorated the grave site

daily with fresh flowers.

(4) On Armistice Day, 1995, the village of Remy renamed

the crossroads near the site of Lieutenant Braly’s death in

his honor.


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