Dear Friend of Radio Liberty,
"The United States has for decades sought to play a more permanent role in Gulf regional security. While the unresolved conflict with Iraq provides the immediate justification, the need for a substantial American force presence in the Gulf transcends the issue of the regime of Saddam Hussein."
Rebuilding America's Defenses: 2000 
"As America becomes an increasingly multicultural society, it may find it more difficult to fashion a consensus on foreign policy issues, except in the circumstances of a truly massive and widely perceived direct external threat."
Zbigniew Brzezinski: The Grand Chessboard 1997 
"The process of transformation, even if it brings revolutionary change, is likely to be a long one, absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event - like a new Pearl Harbor."
Rebuilding America's Defenses: 2000 
"There is a chance for the President of the United States to use the disaster . . . to carry out what his father - a phrase his father used I think only once, and it hasn't been used since - and that is a new world order."
Senator Gary Hart, Sept. 14, 2001. 
"When I got to the White House, it was being evacuated. . . . Then the Secret Service escorted me down to the Presidential Emergency Operations Center, otherwise known as the PEOC. . . . We did not know how many more attacks might be in progress. . . .
During the time that the airplane was coming in to the Pentagon, there was a young man who would come in and say to the Vice President, "The plane is 50 miles out." "The plane is 30 miles out." And when it got down to "the plane is 10 miles out," the young man also said to the Vice President, "Do the orders still stand?" And the Vice President turned and whipped his neck around and said, "Of course the orders still stand. Have you heard any- thing to the contrary?" Well at the time, I didn't know what all of that meant. And. . . ."
911 Commission Testimony, May 23, 2003 
The State Department designed U.S. foreign policy to provoke an Islamic attack. The CIA printed copies of the Koran and promoted Islamic Jihad during the Afghan war, the USAID financed Islamic education during the 1980s, and Saudia Arabia, Pakistan, and the CIA financed Islamic radicals during the 1990s.  The presence of American troops in Saudi Arabia antagonized Muslims. American television and licentiousness offended their values, and the arrogant exercise of power by U.S. officials fomented resentment among Islamic fundamentalists.  Our leaders knew that Islamic radicals would attack the United States, but concealed that fact from the American people. How can I verify that charge? Members of the CFR discussed the coming attack in two government reports.
September 15, 1999: The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century released their Phase I Report. Senator Gary Hart (CFR) and Senator Warren Rudman (CFR) co-chaired the meetings; thirteen of the fourteen Commissioners were members of the Council on Foreign Relations. The report discussed the rationale for the coming terrorist attack:
"The growing resentment against Western culture and values in some parts of the world - as well as the fact that others often perceive the United States as exercising its power with arrogance and self-absorption - is breeding a backlash that can take many forms. Terrorism, however, appears to be the most potentially lethal of such forms. Therefore, the United States should assume that it will be a target of terrorist attacks against its homeland using weapons of mass destruction. The United States will be vulnerable to such strikes." 
"Notable among these new threats is the prospect of an attack on U.S. cities by independent or state-supported terrorists using weapons of mass destruction. Traditional distinctions between national defense and domestic security will be challenged further as the new century unfolds. . . ." 
January 31, 2001: The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century released their Phase III Report. It was titled Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change. The report outlined the program that became The Office of Homeland Security. 
January, 2001: The National Commission on Terrorism released a report on "Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism." Paul Bremer III (CFR), the former Ambassador for Counterterrorism of the U.S. State Department, and Maurice Sonnenberg, co-chaired the National Commission. Their Executive Summary states:
"Today's terrorists seek to inflict mass casualties, and they are attempting to do so both overseas and on American soil."  (page 2, executive summary)
The report discussed the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, and suggested the Japanese succeeded because: "Surprise, when it happens to a government, is likely to be a complicated, diffuse, bureaucratic thing," because of "neglect of responsibility," and "bad luck."  The Bush Administration tried to use a similar explanation to justify the government's failure to anticipate and prevent the 9/11 attack. The National Commission's Report states:
"Surprise, when it happens to a government, is likely to be a complicated, diffuse, bureau- cratic thing. It includes neglect of responsibility but also responsibility so poorly defined or so ambiguously delegated that action gets lost. It includes gaps in intelligence, but also intelligence that, like a string of pearls too precious to wear, is too sensitive to give to those who need it. It includes the alarm that fails to work, but also the alarm that has gone off so often it has been disconnected. It includes the unalert watchman, but also the one who knows he'll be chewed out by his superior if he gets higher authority out of bed. It includes the contingencies that occur to no one, but also those that everyone assumes somebody else is taking care of. It includes straightforward procrastination, but also decisions protracted by internal disagreement. . . . Finally, as at Pearl Harbor, surprise may include some measure of genuine novelty introduced by the enemy, and possibly some sheer bad luck. The results, at Pearl Harbor, were sudden, concentrated, and dramatic. The failure, how- ever, was cumulative, widespread, and rather drearily familiar. This is why surprise, when it happens to a government, cannot be described just in terms of startled people. Whether at Pearl Harbor or at the Berlin Wall, surprise is everything involved in a government's (or in an alliance's) failure to anticipate effectively." 
The Bush Administration claims the terrorists were successful because the U.S. had faulty intelligence, bad luck, and bureaucratic ineptitude, but that isn't true. Vice President Cheney monitored the flight path of Flight 77, the commercial airliner that crashed into the Pentagon. Secretary of Transportation Norman Mineta was in the Presidential Emergency Operating Center with Vice President Cheney as Flight 77 approached Washington, D.C. Secretary Mineta testified:
"During the time that the airplane was coming in to the Pentagon, there was a young man who would come in and say to the Vice President, "The plane is 50 miles out." "The plane is 30 miles out." And when it got down to "the plane is 10 miles out," the young man also said to the Vice President, "Do the orders still stand?" And the Vice President turned and whipped his neck around and said, "Of course the orders still stand. Have you heard anything to the contrary?" 
Have you seen articles about Norman Mineta's testimony in newspapers, or heard it discussed on radio or television? I will discuss the implications of the information in a subsequent letter.
The Intelligence Community consists of the:
Central Intelligence Agency
Department of the Treasury
Department of Energy
Department of State
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA)
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)
National Security Agency (NSA)
U.S. Air Force Intelligence
U.S. Army Intelligence
U.S. Coast Guard Intelligence
U.S. Navy Intelligence; and
U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence 
The U.S. Intelligence Community is the most efficient information-gathering organization in the world. The National Security Administration (NSA) monitors every telephone call, every e-mail, every fax, and every Internet communication; the CIA has undercover agents, assets, and contract agents in foreign countries; the FBI has informants in dissident and patriotic organizations in the United States.  Congress reorganized our Intelligence Community in 1995 and 1996 to deal with the terrorist threat. Funding for most of the agencies was increased, thousands of new agents were hired, and contrary to what the public has been told, arrangements were made to share information between the agencies.  Some members of the Intelligence Community knew the attack was coming; one of them contacted David Schippers, the former Counsel of the House Impeachment Committee. He was told the attack would be on lower Manhattan in late August or early September.  Another agent contacted Dr. Garth Nicolson and told him there would be an attack on the Pentagon on September 11, 2001.  David Schippers tried to contact several officials, but they refused to meet with him.  Dr.Nicolson notified a high-ranking government official. Neither David Schippers nor Garth Nicolson was asked to testify before the House-Senate Select Intelligence Committee, or the 911 Commission.
Steven Emerson produced a video documentary on Islamic terrorism in 1994; he called it The Terrorists Among Us: Jihad in America. The film showed film footage of Abdullah Azzam addressing a group of Islamic radicals in Oklahoma City in 1988. He called for Jihad (Holy War) in the United States. Our Intelligence Agencies knew there were Islamic terrorist cells in the United States at that time, but didn't intervene. Steven Emerson's video includes an interview with Paul Bremer, the State Department's former Ambassador for Counter Terrorism. He was co-chairman of the National Commission On Terrorism. 
Jihad in America was shown only once on PBS in 1994; the video was subsequently suppressed to prevent the public from learning about the growing Islamic threat. 
The Bush Administration claims the Intelligence Community didn't know the identity of the hijackers because the FBI couldn't infiltrate the tightly knit Islamic community.  Is that true? Six of the terrorists were stopped and interviewed before they boarded their planes on September 11 because they were on a passenger watch list.  If the Intelligence Agencies didn't know who the terrorists were, why were six of them "flagged by a computerized airline passenger profiling system?" Two of the hijackers lived with an Islamic FBI informant in Southern California. If our Intelligence Agencies couldn't infiltrate the Islamic community, why did the FBI employ Islamic informants? 
When Kristen Breitweiser testified before the Joint House-Senate Select Investigating Committee, she referred to an article published in The New York Times on September 12, the day after the attack:
"On Tuesday, a few hours (emphasis added) after the attacks, FBI agents descended on flight schools, neighborhoods, and restaurants in pursuit of leads. The FBI arrived at Huffman Aviation at about 2:30 a.m. Wednesday morning. They walked out with all the school's records, including photocopies of the men's passports.
The New York Times also reported that students at Embry Riddle Aeronautical University said that within hours (emphasis added) of the attacks FBI investigators were seen at their school.
How did the FBI know exactly where to go only a 'few hours' after the attacks? How did they know which neighborhoods, which flight schools, and which restaurants to investigate so soon into the case?
The New York Times went on to report that 'federal agents questioned employees at a store in Bangor, Maine, where five Arab men believed to be the hijackers tried to rent cell phones late last week. . . . '
The article goes on to state, 'the men then phoned Bangor airport trying to get a flight to Boston but were told there was no flight that matched their desired departure time. . . . The men then phoned Portland International JetPort, where two of them apparently made reservations for a flight to Boston on Tuesday morning.'
How would this information be gleaned so quickly? How would the FBI know to visit a store in Bangor, Maine only hours after the attacks. Moreover, how would they know the details of a phone conversation that occurred a week prior to the attacks? Were any of the hijackers already under surveillance? . . .
Furthermore, on September 12, The New York Times reported that 'authorities said they had also identified accomplices in several cities who had helped plan and execute Tuesday's attacks. Officials said they knew who these people were and important biographical details about many of them. They prepared biographies of each identified member of the hijack teams and began tracing the recent movements of the men.'
How were complete biographies of the terrorists and their accomplices created in such short time? Did our intelligence agencies already have open files on these men? Were they already investigating them? Could the attacks of September 11 been prevented?" 
How did the FBI know where the hijackers lived, where they took their flight training, their life history, and obtain pictures of them within 48 hours of the attack? How could FBI officials be certain of the hijackers' identities when their bodies hadn't been recovered; they might have used false papers?
If the Intelligence Community couldn't infiltrate the closely knit Islamic movement, how did the Justice Department identify the 1200 Muslims who were arrested immediately after the attack? Several hundred of them are still imprisoned. The Justice Department won't release their names because officials claim they don't want Osama bin Laden to learn their identity. The Justice Department refuses to try the men in court because they don't want Osama bin Laden to know the extent of U.S. surveillance before the 9/11 attack. 
How did the Justice Department know the Muslims they arrested were terrorists? Were they monitored before the 9/11 attack? Were they members of Islamic terrorist cells? Did the arrests disrupt the structure of the Islamic terrorist movement in the United States? Is that why there haven't been other significant terrorist attacks in the U.S. since 9/11?
The Bush Administration tried to prevent a Congressional investigation of the 9/11 attack. When their effort failed, the Executive Branch delayed delivery of government documents, withheld most important information, and insisted on censoring the Joint Select Committee Report.  The public was told that 28 pages of information about Saudi Arabia was deleted from the report. That's a half-truth. Almost a third of the 900 pages of the Select Committee's Report had information deleted to conceal the truth from the American people. Furthermore, some of the most important testimony wasn't included in the Select Committee's Report. 
Intelligence officials testified they knew an attack was imminent, but believed it would be overseas, and didn't suspect the terrorists would use hijacked planes as weapons. That statement is blatantly false.
The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century Report was released on September 15, 1999. It described the coming attack on the United States.
The National Commission on Terrorism report confirmed The National Commission on Security's conclusion.
Prior to the attack the FAA and other government agencies sent out "12 Information Circulars (consisting of 35 pages) dealing with "alerts, warnings, emergency rulings, etc. . . . pertaining to transportation (air-lines, etc) from May 2001 through September 15, 2001." The Information Circulars are still "classified" because their release 'would be detrimental to the security of transportation' if disclosed. The Bush Administration doesn't want Osama to discover the content of the Information Circulars sent out by the FAA, and other agencies, prior to the 9/11 attack. 
The CIA briefed President Bush on August 6, 2001, and told him Islamic terrorists planned to hijack U.S. commercial airliners; the remainder of the briefing remains classified. 
On September 7, 2001, the U.S. State Department issued a worldwide alert warning about a likely terrorist attack on American military bases or embassies in the Middle East, Europe and Asia. If U.S. officials expected an attack overseas, why were U.S. bases placed on alert? 
Did U.S. officials know that terrorists planned to attack the U.S.? Insight magazine listed some of the warnings U.S. Intelligence Agencies received before the 9/11 attack:
March 2001: The Italian government shared "general" information of possible attacks based on bugs in apartments in Milan.
May 2001: An Iranian in custody in New York City told local police about a plot to attack the World Trade Center.
June 2001: German intelligence alerted the CIA, Britain's MI-6 intelligence service and Israel's Mossad that Middle Eastern terrorists were training for hijackings and targeting American and Israeli interests.
July 2001: Indian intelligence shared general information.
August 2001: Based on its own intelligence, the Israeli government provided "general" information to the United States in the second week of August that an al-Qaeda attack was imminent.
French intelligence echoed the "general" information in the final week of August.
Summer of 2001: Russian President Vladimir Putin . . . ordered his intelligence agencies to alert the United States that suicide pilots were training for attacks on U.S. targets. 
Eleanor Hill was the Staff Director of the Joint Inquiry Committee. I will discuss her testimony next month.
Radio Liberty is now heard 4 hours every weekday on shortwave at 5.745 MHz. If you don't have a shortwave receiver, we offer a Sangean 505 digital Shortwave-AM/FM radio with a 24-foot antenna, and carrying case. Call (800) 544-8927 for additional information.
Our evening program (8:00 -10:00 p.m. Pacific time, 11:00 p.m. - 1:00 a.m. Eastern time) is available on Christian satellite. Ask the manager of your local Christian station if he is interested in carrying our program.
Our evening program is heard on several stations in Eastern Washington; Chicago; Flint, Michigan; Albany, New York; Utica, New York, and Fort Wayne, Indiana. If you know anyone interested in advertising on Radio Liberty, please contact me. Fourteen other mid-west stations will carry our programs if we can raise sufficient funding.
Many people are becoming aware of the fact that something is seriously wrong. Constitutional study groups are being organized across America, and Michael Peroutka's campaign for the presidential nomination of the Constitution Party is gaining supporters. The Radio Liberty Internet audience is growing; we have one of the top four listening audiences at Soundwaves 2000. Please encourage your friends to listen to Radio Liberty on short- wave (4 hours a day) or on the Internet at www.radioliberty.com (5 hours a day).
As Easter approaches, and we contemplate the significance of the death and resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth, I want to share a special poem with you. It reflects my belief that each of us can make a difference. When the Sanhedrin condemned our Lord to death, those who supported Him risked a similar fate. Joseph of Arimathea risked everything he possessed when he asked permission to bury the Nazarene. Edgar Guest wrote:
"Joseph of Arimathea in the gloom of a Friday night Visited Pontius Pilate - the envoy of Roman might. "There was a man named Jesus nailed to a cross to-day," Said he, "and I ask permission to care for his lifeless clay."
"Little I know about him, but I've heard that his life was clean. I am told that because of his teachings men hated this Nazarene. Those who are called his apostles still fear what the mob may do, So I ask your august permission to care for a fellow Jew."
And Pilate who trusted Joseph and honored him, promptly said: "I will give you a guard of soldiers. Go now and bury the dead." Thus strangely is history fashioned. From one kindly deed there came To the rich man of Arimathea eternal glory and fame. 
Joseph of Arimathea risked everything he possessed to do what he knew was right. At this time in history, when there is a conspiracy against God, can we do less?
Thank you for your prayers, and your loyal support.
Yours in Christ,
1. Thomas Donnelly et al, Rebuilding America's Defenses, Project for a New American Century, 2000, p.14. Available on the Internet at www.newamericancentury.org or from Radio Liberty.
2. Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard, Basic Books, 1997, p. 211.
3. Thomas Donnelly, op cit., p. 51.
4. "When Globalists Tell The Truth," The New American, October 22, 2001, p. 10. A film clip is available.
5. Norman Mineta, 9/11 Commission testimony, May 23, 2003, www.cooperativeresearch.org/timeline/2003/commissiontestimony052303.html
6. John Cooley, Unholy Wars, Pluto Press, Sterling, Virginia, pp. 106-126. See Also: Joe Stephens et al, "Teaching ABCs and Jihad," The Washington Post National Weekly Edition, April 1-7 2002. See Also: Richard Labeviere, Dollars for Terror, Algora Publishing, New York, pp. 14-15.
7. "New World Coming," U. S. Commission on National Security/ 21st Century, September 15,1999, p. 48.
8. Ibid. "New World Coming" available from Radio Liberty.
9. Ibid., p. 1.
10. "Road Map For National Security: Imperative for Change, Phase III Report," U. S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, January 31, 2001.
11. Executive Summary, National Commission on Terrorism Report, http//usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/00060501.htm
12. Paul Bremer et al, "Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism," The National Commission on Terrorism, www.fas.org/irp/threat/commission. html
14. Norman Mineta, op cit.
15. Joint Inquiry Staff Statement, Part I, Eleanor Hill, Staff Director, Joint Inquiry Staff, September 18, 2002. www.fas.org/irp/congress/2002_hr/091802hill.html, p. 10. Available from Radio Liberty.
16. Terry Cook, Big Brother NSA and Its "Little Brothers," Hearthstone Press, 1998.
17. "Terrorism Law is Major Setback for Civil Liberties," Center for National Security Studies, Washington, D.C.
18. Radio Liberty interview with David Schippers, April 17, 2003.
19. Personal communication with Dr. Garth Nicolson. Documentation available for researchers.
20. David Schippers, op cit.
21. Transcript, "Jihad in America," November 21, 1994.
22. Personal communication
23. "Airline security eyed 9 hijackers in attacks," The Washington Times, March 4, 2002, p. A 8.
24. Dan Eggen, "Who Helped the Hijackers?," The Washington Post Weekly Edition, September 15-21, 2003, p. 10. See Also: The Joint Select Committee Report.
25. Kristen Breitweiser's testimony before the Joint Select Committee, September 18, 2002, pp. 11-13.
26. Jerry Isaacs, "75,000 March in Washington against US militarism and Israeli aggression," World Socialist Web Site, www.wsws.org/articles/2002/apr2002/demos-a22.shtml
27. Walter Shapiro, "It's no secret that 9/11 report is stingy on answers," USA Today, Sept. 20, 2002, A6. See Also: "CIA Accused of Obstructing Panel," The Washington Post, Oct. 4, 2002, washingtonpost.com See Also: James Risen, "White House Said to Rebuff Appearances at 9/11 Panel," The New York Times, September Sept. 13, 2002, p. A 12.
28. Personal review of the Joint Select Committee Report.
29. December 4, 2003 letter to Dr. Dennis Cuddy from the Transportation Security Administration. Copies available.
32. "If the World Was Talking, Why Didn't We Listen?," Insight Magazine, December 9, 2003.
33. Edgar Guest, quoted in The Journal, Summit Ministries, Manitou Springs, CO., April 2000.